UIC Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 4

Spring 1972

Illinois Implied Consent Legislation: Suspension of License upon
Refusal to Submit to Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 5 J. Marshall
J. of Prac. & Proc. 298 (1972)
William Peter Maksym Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William Peter Maksym, Jr., Illinois Implied Consent Legislation: Suspension of License upon Refusal to
Submit to Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 5 J. Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 298 (1972)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/4
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

ILLINOIS'

"IMPLIED

CONSENT"

LEGISLATION:

SUSPENSION OF LICENSE UPON REFUSAL TO
SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION
INTRODUCTION

Since the early days of the horseless carriage, the menace
presented by the inebriated motorist has been recognized by our
courts.' Studies have revealed that fifty to seventy-five per cent
of all fatal accidents on our highways involve motorists who have
been drinking. 2 All fifty states and the District of Columbia have
responded to this problem through the enactment of laws relating
to the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.8 Illinois also possesses a modern example of
this legislation. 4 In order to complement 5 this legislation, aid
its enforcement and obtain evidence, of a driver's intoxication by means of chemical tests, a quasi-criminal Implied
Consent Statute 7 has been adopted in Illinois effective as of
July 1, 1972.8 Thus, to date, forty-nine states,9 including
I See, e.g., State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (1917).
2 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL TRAFFIC SAFETY (8th ed. Feb. 1967).

3 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES, 123-24 (Supp. 1968);
See also An Analysis of the Drunken Driving Statutes in the United States,
8 VAND. L. REV. 888 (1955).1
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 %, §11-501 (1971).
5 Note, however, that violations
of Implied Consent laws and drunk
driving statutes have been held to be separate offenses with separate
penalties. The concept of Implied Consent statutes is simple: an arrested
driver may be asked to consent to the taking of a chemical test; if he makes
an unreasonable refusal, the penalty of a suspended license would be imposed. United States v. Gholson, 319 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Va. 1970).
6 For a discussion concerning the admissibility of chemical tests in
Illinois prior to the enactment of Implied Consent, see 1 DEPAUL L. REV.
298 (1952); 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 117 (1953).
7 Pub. L. No. 77-1881 (July 1, 1972), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95/2,
(Full text of new law follows this article.)
§11-501.1 (Supp. 1972).
sId. §11-501.1(e).
9 See ALA. CODE tit. 36, §154-158 (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. §28.35
(1962), as amended, S.L.A. ch. 83, §§28.35.031-28.35.034 (1969) ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §28-691 (Supp. 1972) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §75-1045 (Supp. 1969) ;
CAL. VEHICLE CODE §13353 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-5-30
(Supp. 1967), as amended, ch. 69, §13-5-30 (1971) Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess.
214; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §14-227b (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§322.261 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §68-1625.1 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§286-151 - 286-162 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §49-352 (1967);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§47-2003c-2003h (Supp. 1971); IOWA CODE ANN. §§321B.1 321B.14 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §8-1001 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §186.565 (Supp. 1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§32:661-32:669 (Supp.
1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §1312 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art.
661h, §92A (Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §24 (1968); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§257.625a-257.625g (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§169.123 (Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN. §§8106-8107 (1942), as amended,
ch. 515 (1971) Miss. Laws Reg. Sess. 721; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§564.441-564-444
(Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§32-2142.1 - 32-2143.3 (Supp.
1971); NEB. REV. STAT. §§39-727.03 - 39-727.14 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§484.383-483.393 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§262-A:69-a - 262-A:69-j
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Illinois,10 have enacted some form of Implied Consent Legislation.
DEVELOPMENT AND THEORY

It is not difficult to understand how this tidal wave of legislation came to pass."
Traffic-safety propagandists have been
extremely successful in informing society of the inherent dangers

of the drunk driver. It was this information, coupled with the
United States Supreme Court's apparent approval of chemical
testing in Briethaupt v. Abram," and the statements of legal
commentators" that no constitutional prohibitions existed to the

administration of a chemical test to a motorist arrested on a
charge of drunk driving which paved the way for Implied

Consent.
There are two basic theories underlying implied consent
laws. First, a state, under its police power, has the right to
impose reasonable regulations 14 regarding the act of driving a
(1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§39:4-50.2 - 39:4-50.7 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§64-22-2.6 - 64-22-2.12 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw §1194
(McKinney Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-16.2 (Supp. 1969); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. §§39-20-01 - 39-20-14 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§751-760
(Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §§483.634-483.646 (1971); PA. STAT. tit. 75,
§624.1 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §31-27-2.1 (1969); S.C. CODE
ANN. §46-344 (Supp. 1970); S.D. COMP. LAWS §33-23-10 (1967) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§59-1045 - 59-1052 (Supp. 1970); TEX. PEN. CODE art. 802f
(Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44.10 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23
§§1188-1195 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §46.20.308 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§17C-5A-1 - 17C-5A-8
(Supp. 1970) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. §343.305 (1971); WYO. STAT. ANN. §39-129
(1959), as amended, ch. 158 (1971) Wyo. Laws Reg. Sess. 200.
The model'for much of this legislation is the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE
§6-205.1.
Only one state has yet to enact Implied Consent. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 21 §4176 (Supp. 1970). One jurisdiction provides for tests to determine
intoxication but expressly reserves the motorist's right to refuse its administration. See D.C. CODE ANN. §40-609a (1967).
The reader is advised that, in any one jurisdiction, several statutory
provisions may relate to drunk driving. It is therefore essential that, when
viewing the illustrative cases and statutes hereinafter mentioned, he make
reference to the applicable legislation in force within a particular state at
the time the litigation transpired.
10 See note 7 sup'ra.
1 See State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267 (1964), for a discussion
relating to the purposes behind and the reasons prompting the enaction of
Implied Consent statutes.
12 352 US. 432, 435-440 (1957).
Here the defendant was unconscious
when a blood test was given. This properly administered blood test was held
not to violate the due process clause, as it was not considered offensive
or shocking per se.
However, in a strong dissent Mr. Justice Douglas argued that the
compulsory extraction of blood was a repulsive invasion of a person's privacy and was therefore violative of the individual's right to due process of
law. Id. at 443.
1" See 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 603-04 (1964). Note, that this author examined
some of the doubts surrounding Implied Consent legislation, particularly
shifting of the burden of proof.
14 The reasonableness of requiring a motorist to submit to chemical
tests and suspending the driver's license of a person who refuses to submit
to such tests after being arrested for driving while intoxicated was noted
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motor vehicle within its boundaries. 15 This authority is justified
when the interests of society are balanced against the rights of

the individual."' The second and most often cited reason is that
the activity of driving an automobile upon the public highways
is not a right but a privilege; ipso facto that privilege may be
subject to reasonable regulation by the state. 17 Thus, a motorist
is deemed to have consented to submit to a chemical test for
intoxication provided that its administration conforms to certain
prescribed standards. Further, upon his failure or refusal to
submit to such tests, 8 his license, which evidences his privilege

to drive may be suspended.' 9
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The development of scientific tests2 0 which could accurately
measure the amount of alcohol in the blood brought about a
means whereby an arresting officer's testimony could be corroborated. The motorist, prior to the use of such tests, would invariably testify to his sobriety, convince the jury and gain an
acquittal. But even after the tests became available, many

drivers refused to submit to them when arrested for drunken
driving. In turn, the police were advised not to give a test
unless they obtained the consent of. the motorist since it was

feared that without such procurement, a violation of the selfincrimination, search and seizure or due process provisions of
21
the state and federal constitutions would inure.
The adoption of Implied Consent Statutes was given impetus

by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v.
in Campbell v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa County, 106 Ariz. 542,
479 P.2d 685 (1971).
15 Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (1967).
16 See 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 698, 706 (1968).
1 See, e.g., State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937) ; Serenko
v. Bright, 70 Cal. Rptr. 1, 263 Cal. App. 2d 682 (1968); Wells v. State,
239 Ind. 415, 158 N.E.2d 256 (1959); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d
765 (1961) ; Mauldin v. State, 239 Md. 592, 212 A.2d 502 (1965) ; Beare v.
Smith, 82 S.D. 20, 140 N.W.2d 603 (1966); Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204
Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963); Chemical Tests for Intoxication: A Legal,
Medical and Constitutional Survey, 37 N.D. L. REv. 212, 252 (1961); 51
MICH. L. REv. 1195, 1200 (1953) ; 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 299, 300 (1960).

18 A refusal or failure to submit is a reasonable ground, in and of itself,
to believe that the motorist was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Sidler v. Strelecki, 98 N.J. Super. 530, 237 A.2d 903 (1968).
19 Pub. L. No. 77-1881 (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 ,
§11-501.1 (Supp. 1972).
20 This paper is not intended to explore the broad and technical area of
chemical testing. For discussion concerning this area the reader is referred
to the following articles: Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practice and Legal Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MIN. L. REv. 673, 675

(1960); R. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1966); Sym-

posium, Breath Alcohol Tests, 5 TR. L. GUIDE 1 (1961); Coldwell & Grant,
A Study of Some Factors Affecting the Accuracy of the Breathalyzer, 8
J. FOR SCIENCE 149 (1963); Watts, Some Observations on Police Administered Tests for Intoxication,45 N.C. L. REv. 34 (1966).
2151 MICH. L. REv. 1195, 1197 (1953).
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California.2 In Schmerber, 3 the court held that merely requiring the accused to become a source of real or physical evidence24 does not violate his fifth amendment guarantee 25 against

self-incrimination.2 The Court also reasoned that consent to a
blood test is not necessary 27 and does not violate an accused's
right to due process when the test is properly administered under
medically accepted circumstances. 2

Further, Schmerber held

that the prohibition 2 9 against unlawful searches and seizures" °
would not apply to the administration of a compulsory chemical
test when made incident to a lawful arrest, justifiably executed
by the police upon probable cause, 1 provided, a procedure satisfying the fourth amendment standards of reasonableness 32 was
applied.
Actions under Implied Consent for refusal to take a breath
test have been held to be a civil and not a criminal proceeding for
34
sixth amendment 33 purposes of an accused's right to counsel.
Therefore, some courts have held that a motorist does not have
a constitutional right to consult with an attorney before he decides to accede to an officer's request to take a chemical test.3 5
22384 U.S. 757 (1966).
23

Id.

24 Id. at 764.

25 U. S. CONST. amend. V.
26 Schmerber v. California,
27 Id. at 760 n. 4.
28

384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).

1 d. at 771.

29 U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 Two cases particularly control

the Illinois position on the permissibility of a search and seizure made incident to a lawful arrest for an alleged
traffic violation. See People v. Reed, 37 Ill. 2d. 91, 227 N.E.2d 69 (1967)
and People v. McKnight, 39 Ill. 2d 577, 237 N.E.2d 488 (1968). For "minor"
traffic violations note the distinction made in People v. Tadlock, 59 Ill. App.
2d 481, 208 N.E.2d 100 (1965).
31 Where probable cause is found to exist, a search warrant will not be
required because the evidence sought, alcohol traces in the blood, would
dissipate if the search were delayed. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
32 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
See also Blood
Alcohol Tests and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 17 DRAKE L. REv. 231
(1968); Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests To Determine
Alcoholic Content, 40 ILL. L. REv. 245, 259-62 (1945); Admissibility and
Constitutionality of Chemical Intoxication Tests, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 813, 830
(1957).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

34 Commonwealth v. Morris, 218 Pa. Super. 347, 280 A.2d 658 (1971);
accord, Plumb v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Cal. Rptr. 639, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 256 (1969).
35 State v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971); Funke v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 81 Cal. Rptr. 662, 1 Cal. App. 3d 449 (1969) ; State
v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970); Rusho v. Johns, 186 Neb. 131,
181 N.W.2d 448 (1970); Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D.
628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170
S.E.2d 199 (1969); Finochairio v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403,
181 N.E.2d 427 (1962). See also 25 A.L.R.3d 1076 (1969) for a general
treatment of the right of a motorist, stopped by the police for various
traffic offenses, to be advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a short discussion of the constitutional
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The intent of the Illinois Legislature on this issue appears to be
quite clear from a reading of the statute.3 6 A motorist is to be
informed that he will have a reasonable opportunity to consult
with his attorney,3 7 and that a failure to consult with counsel
will not excuse or mitigate the effect of a refusal to take or complete the test.3 8
Most importantly, even when these statutes have been
subject to very strict construction, no state court has ever held
the essential provisions of the implied consent laws unconstitutional.39
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE ILLINOIS MOTORIST

Pursuant to the adoption of Illinois' new Implied Consent
Statute, one who drives 40 a motor vehicle within the State of
Illinois impliedly consents 41 to take and complete a breath test
subject to certain considerations. The Illinois Legislature was
highly specific in its declaration of the rights and duties which
the driver of a motor vehicle will possess under Implied Consent.
An understanding of these responsibilities and obligations is essential, not only from the viewpoint of the motorist, but of the
police officer, legal practitioner and the judiciary.
The
to

a

breathalyzer

lawful

arrest,42

test

can

evidenced

only
by

be
a

given
Uniform

incident
Traffic

applicability of Miranda to "Implied Consent Situations", see The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising in a Criminal Proceeding,
74 DICK. L. REv. 219, 237-39 (1970).
86 Pub. L. No. 77-1881 (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch 951/2,
§11-501.1 (Supp. 1972).
7
§11-501.1(a)
1d. §11-501.1
81Id.
(a) (1).
(9).
." See Watts, Some Observations on Police Administered Tests for
Intoxication,45 N.C.L. REV. 34, 101 n.223 (1966).
40 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95%, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972). A distinction has been established between "driving" and "operating" a motor vehicle. The term "drivin " is
given stricted construction. Usually courts hold that the vehicle must ave
been in motion. Although "operating" has been given a similar construction
in some cases, it has been more liberally construed in others to include starting the engine, or manipulating the mechanical or electrical agencies of the
vehicle. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666, 139 S.E.2d
37 (1964). For an extended treatment of this area see 47 A.L.R.2d 570
(1956).
41 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 952, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972). See also text accompanying notes 14
through 18 supra.
Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 951/2, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972). A formal declaration of arrest by a
police officer is not always necessary. State v. Sullivan 65 Wash. 2d 47, 395
P.2d 745 (1964). The requirement of a lawful arrest has been found to be
satisfied where a law enforcement officer merely "stopped" a motorist for the
alleged offense of drunk driving. Freeman v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
74 Cal. Rptr. 259, 449 P.2d 195 (1969). Nebraska courts require that a person
must be arrested or taken into custody before a test to determine intoxication
can be demanded. Prigge v. Johns, 184 Neb. 103, 165 N.W.2d 559 (1969).
For a discussion of whether a "technical arrest" occurs when a motorist is
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Ticket. 43 The ticket must be issued for an offense defined in
Section 11-501 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code 4 4 of a similar

provision of a municipal ordinance. 4 5 Once arrested, the motorist has a right to have the arresting officer make an oral
statement to the effect that his privilege to operate a motor
vehicle may be suspended if he refuses to submit to and com-

plete a breath test. 46 Concurrent with the officer's oral state47
ment, the motorist has the right to receive a printed notice.
After being so advised, the arrested motorist has a right to

study the written notice delivered to him, and to consult with
questioned by a policeman for the purpose of being advised of his rights under Miranda, see 25 A.L.R.3d 1076, 1084 (1969) ; The Pennsylvania Implied
Consent Law; Problems Arising in a Criminal Proceeding, 74 DICK. L. REv.
219, 237-39 (1970).
43 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 , §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972).
44 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §11-501 (1971).
45 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 , §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972). This statute does not preempt the
area of drunken driving and will not supersede or deprive a municipality's
power to enact an ordinance which may vary from that of the State, provided that the ordinance does not conflict with or become repugnant to the
State statute. Village of Mt. Prospect v. Malouf, 103 Ill. App. 2d 88, 243
N.E.2d 434 (1968).
Could it also be possible that the regulations of the
local municipality might provide a different standard of proof and/or a
difference in the percentage of blood alcohol that need be present? See
City of Rockford v. Floyd, 104 Ill. App. 2d 161, 243 N.E.2d 837 (1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 929 (1968).
46 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, §§(a), (d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95 , §11-501.1(a), (d) (Supp. 1972).
Other jurisdictions have
confronted problems in interpreting exactly what type of oral warning is
required by similar provisions in"their implied consent legislation. See, e.g.,
Decker v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. App. 3d 23, 97 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1971) where it was said that to require letter-perfect and technically
complete warnings by a policeman to suspected drunk drivers would defeat
the general purpose of the legislation. The purpose is to obtain the best
evidence of blood alcohol content and therefore a warning that the motorist's
driving privileges "could" be suspended for a certain period of time is sufficient. Accord, Howe v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 82 S.D. 496, 149
N.W.2d 324 (1967).
A Kentucky court said that the officer must request that the motorist
take the tests in addition to warning the driver of the possible consequences
of his or her refusal. Simply asking the motorist to sign a consent form was
held not to be sufficient. Commissioner of Public Safety v. Carpenter, 467
S.W.2d 338 (1971).
It is submitted that the arresting officer's oral statement should be as
follows, per Sidler v. Strelecki, 98 N.J. Super. 530, 237 A.2d (1968):
1. I have a reasonable grounds to believe that you were operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
2. I would like you to submit to a harmless series of two chemical
tests by means of a breathalyzer.
3. Under no circumstances will there be a forceable administration of
the tests.
4. If you refuse to submit to the tests, your refusal may result in the
loss of your driving privileged.
5. Now, I ask you, will you submit to a breath test?
Note that in Sidler the word "may," not "will," was found not to render the
officer's request defective.
47 See Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95%, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972).
See also Appendix, Form 1.
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9

an attorney 48 or other person by telephone.
The motorist has a duty to submit to the two tests
within ninety minutes following receipt of the written noto so submit will constitice, or suffer the risk that his failure
50 under the statute. 1 The failure to consult with
tute a refusa
5
counsel5 2 or supply written permission

3

will not mitigate or

defeat a refusal which will inevitably arise by operation of
law. 54 Similarly, a motorist's subsequent claims that he or she
did not have the capacity to make a rational decision concerning whether or not to take the test due to a lack of intelligence, 55 absence of subjective awareness due to drunkena right to
48 Utah has taken the position that an arrested motorist has

which to make
consult with a lawyer and a reasonable time thereafter within
a sobriety
decline
or
take
to
decision
a
making
before
mind
her
up his or
of the Illinois
test. This state's approach appears to parallel the spirit
(1969). Comstatute. Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877 where
an Idaho
pare, in Mills v. Bridges, 93 Idaho 679? 471 P.2d 66 (1970),
to a
court held that a motorist cannot condition his or her refusal to submit
of a mochemical test upon the presence of counsel. Also, the suspension
where, after
torist's license has even been allowed and was not wrongful
to take the test
being advised of his right to counsel, a motorist refused
subbecause he was under the erroneous impression that he could refuseoftoMotor
mit until after his attorney had arrived. Johnson v. Department
Vehicles, 92 Ore. App. 1530, 485 P.2d 1258 (1971).
49 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (3) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95%A, §11-501.1 (a) (3) (Supp. 1972).
test
50 The question of whether or not a motorist "refused" a chemical
of
Department
v.
Cahall
e.g.,
See,
fact.
of
question
a
be
to
held
has been
refusal
A
(1971).
491
3d
App.
Cal.
16
182,
Rptr.
Cal.
94
Motor Vehicles,
Laws has been held to
to submit to the chemical test under Implied Consent such
that a reasonable
is
motorist
arrested
an
of
conduct
the
occur where
in believing that
person in the arresting officer's position would be justified
unwillingness to
an
manifested
and
refusal
of
capable
was
such motorist
542, 479 P.2d
Ariz.
106
Court,
Superior
v.
Campbell
test.
submit to the
685 (1971).
51 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95%, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972).
52 Id.

even
The United States Supreme Court has taken the position that
have the
before trial, in a lineup identification situation, a suspect mustwas
being
right to counsel, despite the fact that only physical evidence
suspect
the
of
presentation
improper
any
against
insure
to
order
in
sought,
v. Caliby the police. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ; Gilbert
accused
an
that
provided
be
it
could
Similarly,
(1967).
263
U.S.
fornia, 388
to submit to a
motorist must have an attorney present when a request
breathalyzer test is made under Implied Consent so as to check any possible
civil
impropriety on the part of the police? Remember the predominantly
concrete
nature of this statute. Even if this argument were not present, a "Implied
obstacle would still exist: practicality! Also, the nature of inanSchmerber
Consent situation" is such that the "emergency" doctrine stated
would no doubt control. Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See also
note 48 supra.
52 Note 52 supra.
54 See also State v. Pandoli, 109 N.J. Super. 1, 262 A.2d 41 (1970)
an unqualified,
where the court held that anything substantially short of take
a test conunequivocal assent to an officer's request for a motorist to
stitutes a refusal. Accord, Reirdon v. Director, Department of Motor Vehicles, 72 Cal. Rptr. 614, 266 Cal. App. 2d 808 (1968).
55 August v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 52, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1968); Goodman v. Ore, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845.
(1971).
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ness,561 belief of innocence 57 or confusion will not affect the
finality or the effectiveness of a refusal if the proper Implied
Consent admonitions5 9are given. If the arrested motorist is
detained in custody after the state's tests have been conducted,
he has a right to, upon a request made to the police, an additional
chemical test.6 0 This test would appear to be subject to the
same time limitation as that of the state: one hundred fifty
minutes following his or her arrest.6 1 If the additional test is
requested, it is to be made at his or her expense 62 by a qualified
person " of his or her own choosing.6 4 Transportation to the location at which the additional test is to be conducted must be
5
supplied by the police, if necessary.
After the tests are taken or refused and the arresting police
officer has filed a sworn statement in the Circuit Court of the
County in which the arrest was made,6 the motorist must request
State v. Hurbeon, 23 Ohio App. 2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 290 (1970).
McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402 (1969).
58 Smith v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Cal. Rptr. 800, 1 Cal. App.
3d 499 (1969).
56
57

59 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a)

(July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 95 , §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972) ; see also text accompanying notes 46
through
54 supra.
6
oPub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 951/2, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972).
61 Id. §11-501.1 (c).

Id. §11-501.1 (a).
Id. §11-501.1 (a), (b).
For the tentative rules and regulations governing the examination
and licensing of breathalyzer operators, the examination and certification of
the accuracy of breath analysis instruments, the certification of methods
and laboratories, and the procedures for revoking the license of a breathalyzer operator which have been promulgated by the Department of Public
Health of the State of Illinois under the authority prescribed in ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 951/,
§§11-501 - 11-501.1 (Supp. 1972), see Pub. L. No. 77-1881
(July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, §11-501.1 (Supp. 1972),
62

63

RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH,

Rules 1-9 (1972).
64 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a)
(July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95%, §11-501.1(a) (Supp. 1972).
In regard to this right, whether or not such a person is reasonably
available to make such a test is to be determined by the driver and his attorney - it is not an obligation of the police. Holland v. Parker, 84 S.D.
691, 176 N.W.2d 54 (1970).
605Note 64 supra.The" transportation clause," at the onset is likely to cause
great distress among law enforcement officers. Only the Illinois courts can resolve the question of the legislature's intent in regard to this matter. It is
not likely that the Illinois Legislature intended nor that the Illinois courts
will require that the policemen of this state be transformed into chauffeurs.
In all probability the denial of this right may not result in the exclusion
of the state's evidence obtained from its test. As a general presumptive
rule, a state's court will follow specific statutory provisions which attempt to
insure proper interpretation. People v. Johannsen, 126 Ill. App. 2d 31,
261 N.E.2d 551 (1970). But see State v. Batterman, 79 S.D. 191, 110 N.W.2d
139 (1961), where the South Dakota Supreme Court came to the conclusion
that its state's legislature did not understand the language of its own
enactment!
66 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95
§11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972).
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a hearing by written petition67 within twenty-eight days from the
mailing of a notice from the Clerk of that County. If he fails
to request such a hearing within the prescribed time limit, the
Clerk will notify the Secretary of State who will, in turn, automatically revoke the motorist's driver's license.6 8 The requested
hearing is civil in nature69 and limited to the exclusive determination of the following issues:
1.

Whether the motorist was placed under arrest for an offense

defined in Chapter 951 §11-501 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code
or a similar provision of a municipal ordinance,
2. whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that the motorist arrested was driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor,
3. whether the motorist was informed orally and in writing, as
provided under the statute, that his privilege to operate a motor
vehicle would be suspended if he refused to take and complete the
tests, and
4. whether upon the request of the police officer and after being
properly advised
he refused to submit to the complete and re70
quired tests.
If a suspension of the motorist's driver's license results from
a refusal to take the tests, or an adverse determination upon
the hearing, the motorist may submit a written application to
the Secretary of State asking that he or she be issued a restricted
1
driver's permit7
POLICE PROCEDURES AND DUTIES

The policeman is subjected to highly technical requirements
72
under Implied Consent. He may, within a reasonable time
73 made upon his reasonable belief 7 4
following a lawful arrest
that the motorist was driving while under the influence of alco67 Id.
68Td.

69 Id. Proceedings under this type of legislation are administrative and
are not criminal prosecutions. See Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 152

N.W.2d 281 (1967).

70Pub. L. No. 77-1881, §(d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95%, §11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972).
71 Id. §11-501.1(e).
72 Id. §11.501.1(a).
73 See note 42 supra. The issue of whether the motorist was placed

under arrest is to be determined by the test of whether the arresting officer
had reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. Id. Courts have construed "reasonable
grounds" to be the equivalent of "probable cause." See, e.g., Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963); Accord, Thorpe v. Department of

Motor Vehicles, 480 P.2d 716 (1971).
In Van Wormer v. Tofany. 281
N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), it was held that a state trooper, who discovered a
motorist behind the steering wheel of an auto which had gone off the shoulder of the road, had made a valid arrest upon noticing the thick speech of,
and alcoholic odor about, the driver.
74 Where a motorist staggered and wobbled while smelling strongly of
alcohol when arrested by a state trooper who found the driver's pick-up
truck in a ditch, there were "reasonable grounds" to request the test under
"Implied Consent." See Cushman v. Tofany, 321 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1971).
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hol, request 7 5 the motorist to submit7 8 to an analysis of his breath
on a breath testing instrument approved by the Department of
77
Public Health of the State of Illinois.

After the officer has made an oral statement7 8 and concurrently delivered to the motorist the written notice79 supplied by
the Secretary of State, the arrested person should be allowed a

reasonable opportunity ° to study the notice"' and consult with
his attorney. 2 The officer must then obtain the permission of
the motorist in writing.8

It is likely that the test will not be

given at the scene of the arrest by the arresting officer. In all
likelihood, the arrested motorist will be taken to a convenient
location where the tests will be administered by a qualified per-

son.8 ' The "transportation clause" of the Illinois Implied Consent Statute will no doubt become its most controversial provision.8 5

It can only be hoped that the police will seek to make

a good faith compliance with its spirit and that the motorists of
Illinois will not abuse this added protection.
If subsequent to a proper request a refusal results" either

in fact or by operation of law, the statute requires the arresting
officer to follow a certain procedure in order to initiate the legal
75 See note 46 supra.
76 It is important to note that the officer and not the accused motorist
usually has the right to choose whether the test shall be administered. See
Hallet v. Johnson, 276 A.2d 926 (1971); Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa
1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d
765 (1961); Stensland v. Smith, 79 S.D. 651, 116 N.W.2d 653 (1962).
Contra, Bean v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 12 Utah 2d. 76, 362 P.2d 750
(1961), State Department of Highways v. McWhite, 286 Minn. 468, 176
N.W.2d 285 (1970).
7 See note 63 supra.
78 See note 46 supra.
79 See note 47 supra. It would be advisable for the arresting officer to
begin a ninety minute countdown upon the delivery of the written notice
to the arrested motorist for purposes of compliance with the stringent time
restrictions set forth in the statute.
80 See Hanlon v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 80 S.D. 316, 123
N.W.2d 136 (1963).
81 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (a) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 , §11-501(a) (Supp. 1972). The requirement of the detailed written
warning is directed at satisfying minimum fifth and sixth amendment requirements. See State v. Hagen, 180 Neb. 564, 143 N.W.2d 904 (1966).
82 See text accompanying notes 37 and 38 and see also note 81 supra.
83 But see text accompanying note 52 supra.
84 It is generally the case that the breathalyzer is operated by a policeman who has received training in the method of operation of the device.
For a good treatment of the training and background required so that a
policeman can qualify as an expert witness regarding the use of such apparatus - R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES, §29.03 (3d ed.
See also the requirements set forth by the Illinois Department of
1971).
Public Health referred to in note 63 supra.
85 See note 65 supra.
86 Once a motorist refuses to submit to the tests, after a fair warning
of the possible consequences is given, a police officer is not required to turn
away from his other duties and arrange for the administration of a belated
chemical test. Zidell v. Bright, 71 Cal. Rptr. 111, 264 Cal. App. 2d 861
(1968).
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action which could result in suspension of the motorist's privilege
to operate a motor vehicle.8 7 This consists of filing with the
circuit court of the county in which the arrest was made, a sworn
statement 88 of reasonable cause, 8 naming the person refusing to
take the tests and identifying his driver's license number and
current residence. 90 The statement of reasonable cause should
point out:
1.
for
the
2.
the
3.

Facts which will show that the officer had reasonable grounds
believing the motorist was driving a motor vehicle while under
influence of intoxicating liquor, and
that the officer made a request for the motorist to submit to
tests at a specific time and place or places, and
specifically how the motorist refused to submit to the tests.91
EVIDENTIARY ASPECTS

There is little uniformity regarding the issue of whether
evidence of a motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical test
should be admissible in a subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.
Some states favor the admissibility of such evidence.9 2 Others
do not deal with this question in their respective statutes and
have therefore left the issue open for determination by their
courts98 Illinois has chosen to specifically address itself to this
question.9 4 In short, such evidence will be inadmissible in all
proceedings, both civil and criminal except:
1. a civil hearing under Implied Consent relating to the suspension of a person's privilege to drive; and
2. in an action under Chapter 95
§11-501 of the Illinois Motor
Vehicle Code where such evidence is corroborated by an automatically printed record of the test, the test is administered within one
hundred fifty minutes following a lawful arrest and probable cause
is first shown that the motorist was operating a motor vehicle
within the State of Illinois while under the influence of alcohol. 95
87 Pub. Law No. 77-1881, §(d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 951/2, §11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972).
88 See Appendix, Form 2.
89 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, §(d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 , §11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972).
90

91

Id.

Id.
92See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, §155(h) (Supp. 1969); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §28-692(H) (Supp. 1972) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §32.666 (Supp. 1972).
But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-5-30(g) (1967); as amended ch. 69,
§13-5-30(h)
(1971) Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 216; VA. CODE ANN.
§18.1-55.1(i) (Supp. 1971).
98See State v. Holt, 261 Iowa 1089, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968), compare
State v. Hedding, 221 Vt 379 172 A.2d 599 (1961).
94 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, §(c) (July 1 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95%, §11-501.1(c) (Supp. 1972).
The admission of such evidence in
subsequent and related proceedings would no doubt serve to accomplish the
claimed objectives of this type of legislation: the removal of the drunken
driver from our roads.

1d.
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Regardless of the nature of the proceeding, v sufficient
foundation must be laid prior to the introduction of the results
of a breathalyzer test. In State v. Baker,6 the Washington court

held that the introduction of prima facie evidence on the following points is essential to the admissibility of the results of a

breathalyzer test:
1. that the machine was properly checked and in proper working
order at the time the test was conducted;
2. that the chemicals employed were of the correct kind and compounded in the proper proportions;
3. that the subject had nothing in his mouth at the time of the
test and that he had taken no food or drink within fifteen minutes
prior to taking the test;
4. that the test
was given by a qualified operator and in the
97
proper manner.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

The new statute pronounces the procedure98 which is to be
followed pursuant to a refusal by a motorist to take and complete the prescribed chemical tests. Upon the filing of the police
officer's written statement,99 the clerk of the circuit court for
the county in which the arrest was made shall notify 00 the accused motorist in writing that his driver's license will be suspended unless, within twenty-eight days from the date of the mailing of the notice, the motorist requests, in writing, a hearing.'1 1

If this request is not made within that period, the clerk will
notify the Secretary of State and will, in turn, automatically
suspend the motorist's driver's license.102 If a hearing is requested within the prescribed time period and is subsequently
conducted, immediately, upon the termination of the court's proceedings, the clerk will notify the Secretary of State of the
court's decision. 1°3 Upon this notification, the Secretary of State
9656 Wash. 2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960).
97 For a further discussion relating to the foundation required for the

introduction of results from a breathalyzer device and the testimony of
breathalyzer operators. See R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES,
§22.04, 22.05, 29.03 (3d ed. 1971).
98See Pub. L. No. 77-1881, §§(d), (e) (July 1, 1972), amending ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, §11-501.1(d) (e) (Supp. 1972).
99 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
100 See Appendix, Form 4.

101 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95'%, §11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972). See also Appendix, Form 5.
102 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, §(d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 951/2, §11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972).
103 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (d) (July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 951/2, §11-501.1(d)
(Supp. 1972).
See also Appendix, Form 9.
Note that post facto developments concerning a lawful arrest under
Implied Consent have no bearing on the action which the Secretary of State
must take. See Bowers v. Hults, 249 N.Y.S.2d 361, 41 Misc. 2d 845 (1964);
Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 152 N.W.2d 281 (1967); Prucha v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961);
Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J.S. 279, 235 A.2d 37 (1967); Marbut v. Motor Ve-
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shall, if the court so decrees, suspend the license of the motorist
or, upon the court's recommendation, issue a restricted driver's
permit.' 04
WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT

The Illinois Legislature has provided that any person who is
dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to the chemical tests shall be deemed
to have withdrawn the consent provided under the Implied Con10 5
sent Act.
A blood test could be obtained for purposes of a chemical
analysis in a situation where the motorist is unconscious under
the rational of Briethaupt.106 But what about a person who is

"otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal ?,,0 7

Other courts have recognized that a problem exists where the
motorist is incapable of performing the tests due to various
physical or medical incapacities. 1 8 However, this provision
would appear to allow a defense based upon the negation of the
mental element necessary to make a knowing and willful refusal.
Little, if any, litigation has transpired in regard to this problem.
Thus, the Illinois courts will have another opportunity to interpret yet another provision of this complex legislation109
CONCLUSION

In the past, the essential ingredients of implied consent laws
have been upheld. Further, it appears that these ingredients as
adopted in the Illinois Implied Consent Act are constitutional.
However, the statute will present both practical problems in
its administration and legal problems regarding its interpretation. Irrespective of these problems, the breath test should find
favorable acceptance as a major innovation in the fight against
a proven menace.
hicle Department of Highways Commission, 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982
(1965); Combes v. Kelly, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934, 2 Misc. 2d 491, __ N.E.2d ----;
(1956); State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267 (1964). But also note
that where an arrest without a warrant is held unlawful, a subsequent acquittal of the accused may form the basis for challenging the suspension of
the accused's license where an arrest without a warrant is permitted only
for an offense committed in the presence of an officer. McDonald v. Ferguson, 129 N.W.2d 348 (1964).
104 Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (d)
(July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 , §11-501.1(d) (Supp. 1972).
105 Id. §11-501.1 (e).
103 Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), see also note 12 supra.
10T Pub. L. No. 77-1881, § (e)
(July 1, 1972) amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch 951/2, §11-501.1(e) (Supp. 1972).
'()"See, e.g., Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110
N.W.2d 75 (1961) (heart condition); Burson v. Collier, 226 Ga. 427, 175
S.E.2d 660 (1970) (emphysema); Application of Scott, 171 N.Y.S.2d 210.
5 A.2d 859 (1959) (false teeth).
109 One might take the position that the legal principles enunciated in
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The motorist and practitioner should remember that Implied
Consent is not an automatic and irreversible process which
inevitably leads to suspension, liability or possible conviction.
Often, the circumstances of the case will govern its outcome. 10
For the law enforcement agencies, Implied Consent should prove
a powerful weapon, but not a panacea in the war against the
massacre on the highways of this state.
It must be remembered that this statute will operate in a
delicate area. The Illinois Legislature has made every attempt
not to lose sight of the fundamental rights of the individual,
while yielding to the realization of the necessity to act to protect
what has been seen as an overriding public interest. The Illinois
courts will look to the experience of other jurisdictions in an
effort to solve the problems which Implied Consent will necessarily create. Only time will tell whether the legislature's compromise and the wisdom of our courts will ultimately encourage
the cooperation of the citizenry of this state. Hopefully, Implied
Consent will be a success in Illinois, but there can only be one
real measure of it - a significant reduction in the number of
accidents on our roads, especially the fatal ones caused by the
drunk driver.
Walter Peter Maksym, Jr.

the text accompanying notes 55 through 59 will govern Illinois interpretation of this issue by equating the irrelevance of subjective mental incapacity
to submit to that of physical incapacity to submit to the required tests.
110 See, e.g., Howe v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 82 S.D. 496,
149 N.W.2d 324 (1967).
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Suspension of license - Implied Consent.
(a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle anywhere within this
State thereby consents, under the terms of this Section, to take and
complete a test or chemical analysis of his breath to determine the alcoholic content of his blood when made as an incident to and following
his lawful arrest, evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket,
for an offense as defined in Section 11-501 of this Act or a similar provision of a municipal ordinance. Within a reasonable time following
any such arrest, a police officer shall request the person arrested to submit to such analysis of his breath upon a breath testing instrument approved by the Department of Public Health in consultation with the
Department of Law Enforcement which will automatically display the
test results visually to the arrested person and provide for an automatic
printed test record. A test shall consist of 2 breath analyses taken not
less than 15 minutes apart. Each printed recording shall also contain an
automatically printed record of the reading of the testing device made
immediately prior to the recording for the tested person. Each recording shall contain the date and time on which the test was given, which
may be manually printed on the recording.
The officer shall make an oral statement and concurrently deliver
to the arrested person a printed notice supplied by the Secretary of State
in the English and Spanish languages and any other languages deemed
appropriate by the Secretary of State which shall advise the arrested
person:
(1) that by his driving a motor vehicle in this State he has consented to take a test of 2 breath analyses which shall be administered
not less than 15 minutes apart to determine the alcoholic content of his
blood when such test is made as an incident to and following his lawful
arrest for an offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor,
(2) that he may refuse to submit to either such analysis and that
his refusal to submit to either analysis within 90 minutes after receiving
the notice may result in the suspension of his privilege to operate a
motor vehicle for 3 months on his first such arrest and refusal and for 6
months on his second and each subsequent such arrest and refusal within
5 years,
(3) that he may consult with an attorney or other person by phone
or in person within that 90 minutes,
(4) that his failure to submit to and complete the test may be admitted in evidence against him in any hearing concerning the suspension,
revocation or denial of his license or permit,
(5) that he will receive a duplicate original or a photocopy of the
results of any such test to which he submits at the request of the police,
(6) that the results of such test may be introduced in evidence
against him to support the charge of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, and
(7) that a reading of .10% or more by weight of alcohol in the
blood establishes a presumption of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and
(8) that he may secure additional chemical tests at his own expense and that such tests should be taken as soon as possible and are
customarily available from hospitals, medical laboratories and physicians, and
(9) that upon his request full information concerning the results
of such test he took at the request of the police officer will be made
available to him or his attorney.
After being so advised the arrested person may study the written
notice and may consult with an attorney or other person by phone or
in person but refusal to submit to the test within 90 minutes after being
given the written notice shall constitute a refusal to take- the test.
Failure to consult counsel shall not excuse or mitigate the effect of the
refusal to take or complete the test. No test shall be given to any person
without the written permission of that person; willful refusal to give
such written permission, however, shall constitute refusal to submit
to the test within the meaning of this Section.
If the arrested person is detained in the custody of the police after
such test has been administered, the police shall, at the request of the
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arrested person, facilitate the prompt securing of an additional chemical
test by a qualified person of the arrested person's choice and at his own
expense as authorized by paragraph (f) of Section 11-501 and to transport the subject to a location within the county of arrest where services
are available as defined by paragraph (f) of Section 11-501. If these
services are not available in the county of arrest, then transportation
shall be to the next adjacent county where the services are available.
(b)
Any such test made as an incident to and following the lawful
arrest shall be performed according to uniform standards and procedures
adopted by the State Department of Public Health in co-operation with
the Superintendent of State Police. Such standards and procedures
shall include:
(1)
Rules and regulations for examining and licensing any individual who shall administer any such test.
(2)
Procedures for revoking the license of any such individual.
(3)
Rules and regulations for examining and certifying the accuracy of any breath-testing instrument.
Any license issued to any individual to conduct such tests shall
expire one year from date of issuance and any individual who desires to
be licensed again must be re-examined. Any such breath-testing instrument must have been tested for accuracy and certified accurate pursuant to such rules and regulations no more than 30 days prior to the
day the arrested person is requested to submit to the test upon the instrument.
(c)
Evidence of a refusal to submit to the test or chemical analysis under this Section is inadmissible in any civil action or proceeding
other than a hearing on the suspension of a person's privilege to operate
a motor vehicle as provided under the provisions of this Section. Evidence of a refusal to submit to the test under this Section is inadmissible in an action under Section 11-501 of this Act, or in an action for
violation of a local ordinance prohibiting driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. No evidence based upon a
test or chemical analysis of breath shall be admitted into evidence in a
proceeding under Section 11-501 unless corroborated by an automatically
printed recording of the reading of the testing device and unless administered within 150 minutes following such lawful arrest of the person
tested.
No evidence of any test taken pursuant to this Section is admissible
in any criminal proceeding except in a proceeding under Section 11-501.
No evidence of any test may be submitted in a proceeding under Section
11-501 until probable cause is shown that the person was operating a
motor vehicle in the State of Illinois while under the influence of intoxicating liquors.
(d)
The arresting officer shall file with the Clerk of the Circuit
Court for the county in which the arrest was made, a sworn statement
naming the person refusing to take and complete the test requested
under the provisions of this Section. Such sworn statement shall identify the arrested person, his driver's license number and current residence address and shall specify the refusal of that person to take the
test requested and the time, place or places where such request was
made. Such sworn statement shall include a statement that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving the
motor vehicle within this State while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and that such test was made as an incident to and following the
lawful arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11-501 of this Act
or a similar provision of a municipal code, and that the person, after
being arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been
committed while so driving refused to submit to and complete a test as
requested orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) of this
Section.
The Clerk shall thereupon notify such person in writing that his
privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be suspended unless, within 28
days from the date of mailing of the notice, he shall request in writing
a hearing thereon. If such person fails to request a hearing within such
28 day period, the Clerk shall so notify the Secretary of State who shall
automatically suspend such person's driver's license, the privilege
of driving a motor vehicle on highways of this State given to a non-
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resident, or the privilege which an unlicensed person might have to
obtain a license under the Driver's License Act, as provided in Paragraph (a) of this Section.
If such person desires a hearing, he shall petition the Circuit Court
for and in the county in which he was arrested for such hearing. Such
hearing shall proceed in the Court in the same manner as other civil
proceedings, except that the scope of such proceedings shall cover only
the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense
as defined in Section 11-501 of this Act or a similar provision of r
municipal ordinance, whether the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and
in writing as provided in paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate
a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and
complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to
submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer.
Immediately upon the termination of the Court proceedings, the
Clerk shall notify the Secretary of State of the Court's decision. The
Secretary of State shall thereupon suspend the driver's license, the
privilege of driving a motor vehicle on highways of this State given to
a nonresident, or the privilege which an unlicensed person might have to
obtain a license under the Driver's License Act, of the arrested person if
that be the decision of the Court. If the Court recommends that such
person be given a restricted driving permit to prevent undue hardship,
the Clerk shall so report to the Secretary of State.
(e) Regardless of whether such person petitions the Court for a
Court proceeding as provided in Paragraph (d) of this Section, whenever a driver's license is suspended under this Section, the Secretary
of State may, if application is made therefor by the person whose
license is so suspended, issue such person a restricted driver's permit, to
prevent undue hardship, in the same manner, under the same conditions
and with the same limitations specified in Section 6-205 of this Act.
If the person has had a Court hearing as provided for in Paragraph
(d) and if the Court recommended that such person be given a restricted driver's permit to prevent undue hardship, this recommendation
shall be made a part of the hearing before the Secretary of State.
Any person who is dead, unconscious or who is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be deemed to have withdrawn the consent provided by this Section.
Notwithstanding any other provision of Subsection (i) of Section
11-501 of this Act, the Court may, in lieu of a sentence of imprisonment for a conviction under Section 11-501, order any person to serve a
term of not less than 2 days in a hospital, alcoholic or rehabilitation
center, or other such agency or institution, under such terms and conditions as may to the Court be appropriate.
Section 2. This amendatory Act takes effect July 1, 1972, or upon
its becoming a law, whichever is later.
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APPENDIX

OF

FORMS

FORM #1
NOTICE OF REQUEST TO SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL TEST
OF BREATH TO DETERMINE INTOXICATION
Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. Sec. No.

Place of Arrest

Arrest Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date, Time & Place of Request

You have been arrested and charged with the offense of driving while intoxicated in violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a
similar municipal ordinance, to wit:
You are hereby requested to submit to a chemical test of your breath
to determine the extent of that alleged intoxication. Such chemical tests
shall consist of 2 breath analyses.
1. By your driving a motor vehicle in this state you have consented to
take 2 breath analyses which shall be administered not less than 15 minutes
apart to determine the alcoholic content of your blood when such analyses
are made as an incident to and following your lawful arrest for an offense
of driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
2. You may refuse to submit to either such analyses and your refusal
to submit to either analyses within 90 minutes after receiving this notice
may result in the suspension of your privilege to operate a vehicle for 3
months on your first such arrest and refusal, and suspension for 6 months
on your second and each subsequent such arrest and refusal within the preceding 5 year period.
3. You may consult with an attorney or other person by phone or in
person within 90 minutes.
4. Your failure to submit to and complete these analyses may be admitted in evidence against you in any hearing concerning the suspension,
revocation or denial of your driver's license or permit or privilege to operate
a motor vehicle.
5. You will receive a duplicate original or a photocopy of the results
of any such analyses to which you submit.
6. The results of such analyses may be introduced in evidence against
you to support the charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
7. A reading of 0.10% or more of alcohol in the blood establishes a
presumption of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
8. You may secure additional chemical tests at your own expense.
Such tests should be taken as soon as possible and are customarily available
at hospitals, medical laboratories and physicians' offices.
9. Upon your request, full information concerning the results of such
analyses will be made available to you or your attorney.
After being so advised you may study this written notice and may consult with an attorney or other person by phone or in person, but refusal to
submit to the analyses within 90 minutes after being given this written notice
shall constitute a refusal to take the analyses within the purview of Section
11-501.1. Failure to consult counsel shall not excuse or mitigate the effect of
your refusal to take or complete the analyses. No analyses shall be given to
you without your written permission hereon; willful refusal to give such
written permission, however, shall constitute refusal to submit to the analyses within the purview of Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
, having had the above
I,
statement read to me and having received a copy of same, do hereby give
permission for the above described chemical tests and analyses to be administered to me.
Officer

Identifying
Number

Driver

Date, Time & Place of Signing
Date, Time & Place of Refusal
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#2

Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. Sec. No.

Place of Arrest

Arrest Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date, Time & Place of Request

Date, Time & Place of Refusal

Method of Refusal

REPORT AND AFFIDAVIT OF ARRESTING OFFICER
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF
I hereby certify that I have placed the above named person under
arrest, and that I had reasonable grounds to believe that said person was
driving a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in that:
I further certify that said person did willfully refuse to submit to the
breath analyses when requested to do so in accordance with Section 11-501.1
of the Illinois Vehicle Code, after being informed of the possible consequences of his or her refusal.
Identifying
Number

Arresting Officer

day of

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
A.D., 19Notary Public
OR
Clerk of Court
County of
Police Officer -

File with Circuit Clerk of

County

1972]

Implied Consent
FORM

#3

Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. Sec. No.

Place of Arrest

Arrest Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date, Time & Place of Request

Date, Time & Place of Refusal

Method of Refusal

REPORT AND AFFIDAVIT OF ARRESTING OFFICER
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF

I hereby certify that I have placed the above named person under
arrest, and that I had reasonable grounds to believe that said person was
driving a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in that:

I further certify that said person did willfully refuse to submit to the
breath analyses when requested to do so in accordance with Section 11-501.1
of the Illinois Vehicle Code, after being informed of the possible consequences of his or her refusal.
Arresting

Officer

Identifying
Number

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of
A.D., 19

Notary Public

OR
Clerk of Court
County of
Circuit Clerk -

Retain

-
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TO:
Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. Sec. No.

Place of Arrest

Arrest Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date, Time & Place of Request

Date, Time & Place of Refusal

Method of Refusal

NOTICE TO MOTORIST
A

sworn

statement

has been filed

with the

County, by

Circuit

Court of

Arresting Officer

that you were arrested for driving a motor

Staff Member

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. That after having
been read and given a written statement as required in Section 11-501.1,
Illinois Vehicle Code, you did refuse to submit to such analyses as set forth
in said section.
NOW THEREFORE
Notice is hereby given to you that a report will be made to the Secretary
of State which will result in the suspension of your driving privileges for at
least 3 months for the first such refusal and 6 months for any second or
subsequent refusal unless a written request for a hearing is made by you to
this Office within 28 days from the date of this notice; said hearing will
determine the following issues:
1.

2.
3.

Whether or not you were placed under arrest for the offense of
driving while intoxicated as defined in Section 11-501.1 or a similar
provision of a municipal ordinance.
Whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
you were driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Whether you were informed orally and in writing as required by
statute, that your driver's license or privilege to operate a motor
vehicle would be suspended if you refused to submit to and complete
such analyses and whether, after being so advised, you did refuse
to submit to and complete such analyses upon request of arresting
officer.
Dated this

day of

,

Circuit Clerk

Circuit Clerk -

Send to Motorist

19

__

Implied Consent
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FORM

#5

Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. Sec. No.

Place of Arrest

Arrest Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date. Time & Place of Request

PETITION FOR HEARING
I have received a Notice from the Circuit Clerk of
County, that
has filed a sworn statement stating that I
was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, and that after having been read and given a written
statement as required in Section 11-501.1, Illinois Vehicle Code, I refused
to submit to such analyses as set forth in said section.
The said Notice further stated that, unless I made a written request for
a hearing within 28 days from the date of mailing of the Notice, my driving
privileges would be suspended.
I hereby request a hearing on the officer's sworn statement and ask
that the Circuit Clerk advise me of the date, time and place set for the
hearing.

Petitioner's Signature

Petitioner's Address
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Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. Sec. No.

Place of Arrest

Arrest Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date & Time of Request

NOTICE
A sworn statement has been filed with the Circuit Court of
County, by
Arresting Officer

that you were arrested for driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. That after having
been read and given a written statement as required in Section 11-501.1,
Illinois Vehicle Code, you did refuse to submit to such analyses as set forth
in said section.
NOW THEREFORE
Notice is hereby given to you that a report will be made to the Secretary
of State which will result in the suspension of your driving privileges for
at least 3 months for the first such refusal and 6 months for any second
or subsequent refusal unless a written request for a hearing is made by
you to this Office within 28 days from the date of this notice; said hearing
will determine the following issues:
1. Whether or not you were placed under arrest for the offense of
driving while intoxicated as defined in Section 11-501 or a similar
provision of a municipal ordinance.
2. Whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
you were driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
3. Whether you were informed orally and in writing as required by
statute, that your driver's license or privilege to operate a motor
vehicle would be suspended if you refused to submit to and complete
such analyses.
4. Whether upon the request of the arresting officer, and after being
properly advised as prescribed under the statute, you refused to
submit to and complete the required tests.

Dated this

day of

,

Circuit Clerk

Circuit Clerk -

Retain

19

_

1972]

Implied Consent

FORM

#7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the
A.D., 19

-,

day of

I deposited in the United

States Mail, a true and correct copy of the Notice on the reverse side of this
document, in a sealed envelope, First Class Mail, Postage fully prepaid,
addressed in accordance with the address furnished this office by the arresting officer to the named person, pursuant to Section 11-501.1, Illinois Vehicle
Code.

Clerk of the Circuit Court
Deputy Clerk
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NOTICE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. See. No.

Place of Arrest

Ticket No.

Date & Time of Arrest

Date & Time of Request

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I
THE CIRCUIT CLERK OF
hereby certify that on
date

COUNTY, do
a notice

month

year

was given in accordance with the Illinois Vehicle Code governing such notices
to the above named
Driver

by depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, notice as required
by Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, that 28 days have elapsed
since the above date, that no written request for a hearing has been received
or filed herein. This matter is reported to you in accordance with Section
11-501.1, Illinois Vehicle Code.
Circuit Clerk

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I,
THE CIRCUIT CLERK OF
do hereby certify that pursuant to statute on

date_

date

COUNTY,
month _
year
month
year

a hearing was held before the Honorable
in the Circuit Court of
County, Case No.
It is the decision of the Court that the Secretary of State shall take the
following action: (Check that which is applicable)

o

Do not suspend the driver's license or driving privileges of
the person named above

o

Suspend the driver's license or driving privileges of the
person named above

O

Recommendation is made for the issuance of restricted
driving permit

o

No recommendation is made for the issuance of a restricted
driving permit

This is reported to you in accordance with the provisions of Section
11-501.1, Illinois Vehicle Code.
Circuit Clerk

Circuit Clerk -

Mail to Secretary of State

1972)

Implied Consent
FORM

#9

NOTICE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Name

Driver's License No.

Street Address

Date of Birth

City & State

Soc. See. No.

Place of Arrest

Ticket No.

Date and Time of Arrest

Date & Time of Request

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I,
THE CIRCUIT CLERK OF
hereby certify that on _
date

COUNTY, do
a notice

month

year

was given in accordance with the Illinois Vehicle Code governing such notices
to the above named
Driver

by depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, notice as required
by Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, that 28 days have elapsed
since the above date, that no written request for a hearing has been received
or filed herein. This matter is reported to you in accordance with Section
11-501.1, Illinois Vehicle Code.
Circuit Clerk

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I,
THE CIRCUIT CLERK OF
do hereby certify that pursuant to statute on

COUNTY,
date

month

year

a hearing was held before the Honorable
in the Circuit Court of
County, Case No..
It is the decision of the Court that the Secretary of State shall take the
following action: (Check that which is applicable)

o
0

o
]

Do not suspend the driver's license or driving privileges of
the person named above
Suspend the driver's license or driving privileges of the
person named above
Recommendation is made for the issuance of restricted
driving permit
No recommendation is made for the issuance of a restricted
driving permit

This is reported to you in accordance with the provisions of Section
11-501.1, Illinois Vehicle Code.
Circuit Clerk

Circuit Clerk -

Retain
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Name

Arresting Officer

Street Address

Arrest Ticket No.

City & State

Date, Time & Place of Request

Case No.

Driver's License No.

Date, Time & Place of Arrest

Date

COURT ACTION AND OTHER ORDERS
Report and Affidavit of Arresting Officer filed.
Clerk's Notice to driver given as shown by copy of
Notice with Certificate of Mailing attached.
Written request for hearing filed.
Set for hearing before the Honorable
at __
O'clock _.M. on the
day of __
,
19
_
Notice of hearing given by mail to the driver, arresting officer, State's Attorney and
Hearing Continued to
The matter having been heard by the Court, the Court
finds as follows:
1. Said driver 0l was
placed under arrest for
El was not
the offense of driving while intoxicated as defined in Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code or a similar provision of a municipal
ordinance;
2. The arresting officer [ did
have reasonaEl did not
ble grounds to believe that said driver was
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
3. Said driver El was
informed orally and in
El was not
writing as required by statute that his driver's
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle
would be suspended if said driver refused to
submit to and complete the breath analyses
as requested; and
4. After being so informed, said driver [ did
E] did not
refuse to submit to and complete such analyses
upon request of the arresting officer.
5.
It is therefore the decision of the Court that:
E] The driver's license or driving privileges of said
driver El be
suspended.
El not be
El It is recommended that said driver be issued a
restricted driving permit.
Judge

I

Notice given the Secretary of State

